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FLORIDA’S PATIENTS’ RIGHT TO KNOW ABOUT ADVERSE
MEDICAL INCIDENTS (AMENDMENT 7)
Kelly G. Dunberg*
Abstract
This Note addresses the impact of Florida’s Patients’ Right to Know
About Adverse Medical Incidents (commonly known as Amendment 7) on
the peer review process and the quality of healthcare in Florida. Enacted in
2004 as an amendment to the Florida Constitution, Amendment 7 provides
citizens access to records and reports of past adverse medical incidents
involving doctors, hospitals, and healthcare providers. Critics of
Amendment 7 argue that peer review privilege protections are necessary to
maintain high-quality healthcare in Florida, pointing to the need to
encourage candid and vigorous evaluations by physicians of their
colleagues. In contrast, Amendment 7 supporters argue that it provides
Florida patients with valuable information to aid in their choice of
physicians.
While it is still too early to determine Amendment 7’s impact on the
peer review system, and thus on the quality of healthcare systems
statewide, any possible solution to counteract Amendment 7 would be
beneficial to Florida patients. Under Amendment 7, healthcare providers
likely will not critically analyze fellow physicians during peer review
because of a lack of confidentiality and privilege protections. Peer review
will no longer feature the full disclosure by specialized healthcare
practitioners that is necessary for its maximum effectiveness. As a result,
patients likely will suffer a decline in the quality of healthcare.
Congress enacted the Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act
(PSQIA) in response to a startling finding in 1999 by the Institute of
Medicine that between 44,000 and 98,000 patients die annually in
American hospitals due to medical errors. The PSQIA creates patient
safety organizations (PSO) and the Network of Patient Safety Databases
(NPSD), which enable healthcare providers to share reports of adverse
medical incidents with the assurance of confidentiality and privilege
protections. Joining a PSO may alleviate providers’ fear of participation in
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the peer review process.
Through the PSQIA, Florida healthcare providers will not only
improve the quality of healthcare by protecting peer review, but also by
analyzing and aggregating PSO-submitted information. PSOs foster an
environment in which providers can learn from their mistakes and the
mistakes of others. Through the sharing of patient safety event information
within PSOs and the NSPD, Florida healthcare providers will be able to
counteract Amendment 7 and guarantee the exchange of medical
information and data. Therefore, while the interplay between Florida’s
Amendment 7 and Congress’s PSQIA has yet to be determined, the impact
of the PSQIA is that adverse medical incidents will likely be reduced
overall, despite the interference of Amendment 7 with full and frank peer
review in Florida.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1999, the Institute of Medicine’s To Err Is Human report (IOM
Report) found that between 44,000 and 98,000 patients die annually in
American hospitals due to medical errors, an estimate that caused medical
error to exceed the then-eighth leading cause of death—suicide.1 The
startling findings of the prevalence of medical errors thrust the national
healthcare system into the spotlight,2 with the staggering estimates also
exceeding the number of deaths caused by vehicle accidents and breast
cancer.3 Yet the IOM Report asserted that these estimates were perhaps
just the “tip of the iceberg.”4 It additionally stated that adverse medical
incidents result in at least $17 billion in total national costs.5 Implementing
the IOM Report’s recommendations,6 the Patient Safety and Quality
Improvement Act (PSQIA) was enacted on July 29, 2005,7 to assist and
encourage healthcare providers to develop and participate in voluntary
1. INST. OF MED., TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 26 (Linda T. Kohn
et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter TO ERR IS HUMAN] (citing Donna L. Hoyert et al., Deaths: Final Data
for 1997, NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP., June 30, 1999, at 1, 27, available at http://www.cdc.gov/
nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr47/nvs47_19.pdf). The report defines “medical error” as the incorrect
administration of care or the occurrence of an unplanned result. Id. at 4. Injury caused by healthcare
providers—known as iatrogenesis—is considered the opposite of quality care. BARRY R. FURROW
ET AL., LIABILITY AND QUALITY ISSUES IN HEALTH CARE 41 (6th ed. 2008).
2. See TO ERR IS HUMAN, supra note 1, at 4.
3. Id. at 26 (citing Joyce A. Martin et al., Births and Deaths: Preliminary Data for 1998,
NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP., Oct. 5, 1999, at 1, 6, available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr
47/nvs47_25.pdf). While the current mortality by medical error rates vary, reports indicate that they
have increased since 1999. See infra notes 259–64 and accompanying text. For instance, one report
found that medical error deaths in 2007 were the fifth leading cause of death in the U.S., reaching
98,000 deaths annually. Press Release, Millennium Research Group, Medical Error Is the FifthLeading Cause of Death in the U.S. (Sept. 22, 2006) (citing MILLENNIUM RESEARCH GRP., US
MARKETS FOR ACUTE CARE CLINICAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS 2006 (2006), available at
http://mrg.net/News-and-Events/Press-Releases/MEDICAL-ERROR-IS-THE-FIFTH-LEADINGCAUSE-OF-DEATH.aspx). Meanwhile, for comparison, the mortality rates for vehicle accidents
and breast cancer have remained relatively stable. Jiaquan Xu et al., Deaths: Final Data for 2007,
NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP., May 20, 2010, at 1, 32–35 tbl.10, available at http://www.cdc
.gov/NCHS/data/nvsr/nvsr58/nvsr58_19.pdf.
4. TO ERR IS HUMAN, supra note 1, at 87 (internal quotation marks omitted).
5. Id. at 1–2 (citing Eric J. Thomas et al., Costs of Medical Injuries in Utah and Colorado,
36 INQUIRY 255, 260 (1999)). These total national costs include “lost income, lost household
production, disability and health care costs.” Id. at 1 (citing Thomas et al., supra, at 355–64).
6. INST. OF MED., TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM–SUMMARY 3–4
(1999) [hereinafter TO ERR IS HUMAN SUMMARY], http://www.iom.edu/~/media/Files/Report%20
Files/1999/To-Err-is-Human/To%20Err%20is%20Human%201999%20%20report%20brief.pdf.
7. Pub. L. No. 109-41 (2005) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 299b-21 to -26); see also Charles M.
Key, The Role of PSQIA Privilege in Medical Error Reduction, HEALTH L., Oct. 2008, at 24.
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reporting systems concerning patient safety events.8 The IOM Report
stated that preventable medical errors from healthcare providers’
systematic flaws could be determined, analyzed, and addressed through the
creation of a network of shared patient safety data and information.9 Thus,
the PSQIA enables healthcare providers to share their records and reports
of medical errors and “near misses” to other providers by joining a patient
safety organization (PSO).10 The PSQIA ensures that information shared
within PSOs is privileged and confidential11 to encourage providers’
participation without the fear of liability.12 The PSQIA took effect on
January 19, 2009.13 Now there are approximately eighty listed PSOs across
the nation14 sharing information to address the prevalence of medical errors
and to improve the quality of healthcare.
More than ten years after the publication of the IOM Report, the
healthcare system was again brought into the national spotlight in 2010,
when Congress passed new healthcare reform measures.15 Even after that
reform, healthcare continues to be hotly debated nationally.16 One of the
concerns about the reform has been its potential to decrease the quality of
healthcare nationwide.17 However, unbeknownst to many Floridians, the
2004 enactment of Florida’s Patients’ Right to Know About Adverse
Medical Incidents,18 commonly referred to as Amendment 7,19 has already
8. See Patient Safety and Quality Improvement, 73 Fed. Reg. 70,732, 70,732 (Nov. 21,
2008) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 3 (2009)).
9. TO ERR IS HUMAN SUMMARY, supra note 6, at 3.
10. See infra Section IV.B.
11. 42 U.S.C. § 299b-22 (2006); 42 C.F.R. §§ 3.204, 3.206 (2010).
12. See infra note 133 and accompanying text (describing physicians’ fear of liability as the
primary reason for not engaging in the open discussion of patient safety events).
13. Patient Safety and Quality Improvement, 73 Fed. Reg. at 70,732.
14. Geographic Directory of Listed Patient Safety Organizations, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE
RES. & QUALITY, http://www.pso.ahrq.gov/listing/geolist.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2012)
[hereinafter Geographic Directory].
15. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010);
see also Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–152, 124 Stat.
1029 (2010).
16. See, e.g., Bill Mears, Federal Judge Tosses out Sweeping Health Care Reform Act, CNN
POLITICS (Feb. 1, 2011), http://www.cnn.com/2011/POLITICS/01/31/health.care.unconstitutional
/index.html?iref=allsearch; see also, e.g., Elizabeth Sheyn, Toward a Specific Intent Requirement in
White Collar Crime Statutes: How the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 Sheds
Light on the “General Intent Revolution,” 64 FLA. L. REV. 449 (2012).
17. See, e.g., Ceci Connolly & Jon Cohen, Most Want Health Reform but Fear Its Side
Effects, WASH. POST, June 24, 2009, at A01 (discussing fears of lower quality, fewer choices, and
higher costs).
18. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 25.
19. See Richard Johns, Amendment 7: The Patients’ Right to Know Flexes Its Muscle in
Florida, LAW WATCH (Foley & Lardner LLP, Orlando, Fla.), May 25, 2006, at 1, available at
http://www.foley.com/files/tbl_s31Publications/FileUpload137/3390/Law%20Watch%20May%2
025,%202006.pdf.
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created the potential for a decrease in the quality of healthcare statewide
due to its negative impact on Florida’s peer review system.20
Amendment 7 provides Florida patients access to any records or reports
of past adverse medical incidents involving doctors, hospitals, and
healthcare providers.21 It was one of three medical malpractice
amendments featured on the November 2004 statewide ballot.22 Through
the citizen initiative process authorized by the Florida Constitution,23 all
three of the proposed amendments passed and were incorporated into the
Florida Constitution.24 Although Amendment 7 appeared to enjoy strong
20. See James C. Sawran & Robert C. Weill, Amendment 7: Will the Patient’s Right to Know
Come at Too High a Price?, TRIAL ADVOC. Q., Spring 2005, at 7, 8–10 (describing Amendment 7’s
detrimental effect on the quality of healthcare because of the eradication and undermining of
existing peer review and self-critical analysis protections); see also Eric S. Matthew, Note, A New
Prescription: How a Thorough Diagnosis of the “Medical Malpractice” Amendments Reveals
Potential Cures for Florida’s Ailing Citizen Initiative Process, 14 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 331, 351
(2006) (stating that Amendment 7 may decrease the quality of healthcare due to its repeal of
statutory privileges designed to protect the analysis of the quality of treatment and physicians).
21. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 25(a).
22. November 2, 2004 General Election, Official Results, Constitutional Amendment, DIV.
ELECTIONS, FLA. DEP’T STATE, http://doe.dos.state.fl.us/elections/resultsarchive/SummaryRpt.asp
?ElectionDate=11/2/2004&Race=AMD (last visited Jan. 29, 2012) [hereinafter 2004 Election
Results].
23. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 3. The Florida citizen initiative process enables voters to adopt
constitutional amendments through a general election. See Jon Mills & Timothy McLendon, Setting
a New Standard for Public Education: Revision 6 Increases the Duty of the State to Make
“Adequate Provision” for Florida Schools, 52 FLA. L. REV. 329, 359 n.146 (2000); see also
Sawran & Weill, supra note 20, at 7. A sponsor submits an initiative’s ballot title and proposed
amendment text to the Division of Elections of the Department of State. After receiving approval
from the Department of State, the sponsor must then gather the required number of signatures.
Before the initiative is placed on the ballot, the Florida Supreme Court reviews the proposed
initiative via a petition for an advisory opinion from the Attorney General. Id. at 7–8; see also Mary
Coombs, How Not to Do Medical Malpractice Reform: A Florida Case Study, 18 HEALTH MATRIX
373, 378 (2008). The Florida Supreme Court’s advisory opinion determines if the initiative meets
the single subject requirement and if the ballot title and text are unambiguous. Coombs, supra, at
378. The initiative will then appear on the ballot if the Florida Supreme Court does not reject the
proposed initiative and if the sponsor receives the required number of signatures at least ninety-one
days before the general election. See Sawran & Weill, supra note 20, at 7.
24. Amendment 3 and Amendment 8 were the other two medical malpractice amendments.
See Coombs, supra note 23, at 376. Known as the Medical Liability Claimant’s Compensation
Amendment, Amendment 3 limits attorney contingency fees in malpractice suits. Amendment 3 is
now article I, section 26 of the Florida Constitution. The Medical Liability Claimant’s
Compensation Amendment, DIV. ELECTIONS, FLA. DEP’T. STATE, http://election.dos.state.fl.us/
initiatives/initdetail.asp?account=37767&seqnum=1 (last visited Jan. 29, 2012). Amendment 8,
commonly referred to as “Three Strikes and You’re Out,” requires the revocation of a physician’s
license after the physician has committed medical malpractice three or more times. Coombs, supra
note 23, at 376, 392 (quoting Editorial, Keep Malpractice Fight out of State Constitution, PALM
BEACH POST, Oct. 7, 2004, at 18A (internal quotation marks omitted)). Amendment 8 is now article
X, section 20 of the Florida Constitution. Public Protection from Repeated Medical Malpractice,
DIV. ELECTIONS, FLA. DEP’T STATE, http://election.dos.state.fl.us/initiatives/initdetail.asp?account=
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electoral support,25 a “firestorm of litigation” concerning Amendment 7’s
application and constitutionality quickly commenced following its
passage.26 Since that time, Amendment 7 has been anything but “a simple
amendment directed to overruling an exemption.”27
This Note addresses the impact of Amendment 7 on the peer review
process and the quality of healthcare in Florida. By promoting the quality
of healthcare through the sharing of patient safety information, the PSQIA
can counteract Amendment 7’s detrimental effect on the peer review
process. Part I summarizes the peer review process. Part II discusses peer
review protections in Florida before Amendment 7. The enactment of
Amendment 7 and the responses by the Florida legislature and Florida
courts then follow. Part II concludes with a description of the current
landscape under Amendment 7. Part III outlines the enactment and purpose
behind the PSQIA, explains the creation of PSOs and the Network of
Patient Safety Databases (NPSD), and describes the confidentiality and
privilege protections under patient safety work product (PSWP) and patient
safety evaluation systems (PSES). Part III concludes with a discussion of
the judicial response to the PSQIA and the future of the PSQIA. Part IV
discusses the PSQIA as a potential solution to ensure the quality of
healthcare by counteracting Amendment 7’s detrimental effect on the
sharing and analysis of patient safety events through the peer review
process. Part IV also explains the process of becoming a PSO and the
advantages and disadvantages of joining a PSO. Finally, this Note
concludes that while it is still too early to determine Amendment 7’s
impact on the peer review system and consequently on the quality of
healthcare systems statewide, any possible solution to counteract
Amendment 7 is beneficial to the consumer patient.
Under Amendment 7, healthcare providers are less likely to engage in
critical analysis of their fellow physicians during peer review because of a
lack of confidentiality and privilege protections. It follows, then, that peer
review will no longer yield the kind of discourse that is necessary for its
35169&seqnum=8 (last visited Jan. 29, 2012).
25. A total of 81.2% of Floridians (5,849,125) voted for Amendment 7 in comparison to the
18.8% of Floridians (1,358,183) who voted against it. 2004 Election Results, supra note 22.
26. Sawran & Weill, supra note 20, at 7; see also J.B. Harris, Riding the Red Rocket:
Amendment 7 and the End to Discovery Immunity of Adverse Medical Incidents in the State of
Florida, FLA. B.J., Mar. 2009, at 20, 20–21 (“[F]rom the point of ignition until now, Amendment 7
has taken off like a rocket, leaving in its trail a plume of litigation and court rulings that have had a
dramatic impact on the way medical malpractice attorneys engage in discovery, and the way
doctors, hospitals, and other health care providers conduct peer review, credentialing,
investigations, quality assurance, and risk assessments.”).
27. Mark D. Killian, Academy, FMA Square Off over Amendments, FLA. B. NEWS, July 1,
2004 (quoting former Florida Supreme Court Justice Harry Lee Anstead) (internal quotation marks
omitted), http://www.floridabar.org/DIVCOM/JN/jnnews01.nsf/cb53c80c8fabd49d85256b5900
678f6c/d2df312684ca6d7985256ebb0054607f.
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full effectiveness. As a result, Florida patients will likely suffer a decrease
in the quality of healthcare. Additionally, Amendment 7’s broad scope will
probably increase the number of medical malpractice claims, thus
increasing medical malpractice insurance premiums. As these premiums
increase, Florida consumer patients will be forced to pay higher medical
costs. Therefore, Florida patients’ quality and cost of healthcare are
potentially at stake.
I. THE PEER REVIEW PROCESS
The first peer review committees were created in 1918 by the American
College of Surgeons to assess the quality of care at local hospitals; these
committees began the national recognition of medical errors.28 Over the
past century, the peer review process has become key in assuring the
quality of medical care and “has become an institutionalized practice.”29
The process begins at the credentialing stage, when peer review
committees (composed of physicians with specialized medical knowledge)
review a medical staff applicant’s education, experience, qualifications,
and training.30 Peer review continues for existing medical staff by
analyzing “quality assurance data, diagnostic and laboratory utilization
reports, and other information regarding each staff member’s actual
practice at the hospital.”31 Generally, each member of a hospital’s medical
staff is required to undergo peer review every two years regardless of
whether a quality concern has occurred; however, a physician’s clinical
privileges are reviewable whenever quality concerns warrant more
immediate action.32
Peer review creates a system of “self-policing and self-regulating”33
among doctors, hospitals, and healthcare providers. The information
gathered from peer review reports enables medical professionals to take
corrective actions and measures, such as increasing training programs,
creating standardized procedures, and revoking physician privileges when

28. See Kathryn Leaman, Note, Let’s Give Them Something to Talk About: How the PSQIA
May Provide Federal Privilege and Confidentiality Protections to the Medical Peer Review
Process, 11 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 177, 178 (2007).
29. Talia Storch, Note, Medical Peer Review in Florida: Is the Privilege Under Attack?, 32
NOVA L. REV. 269, 269–70 (2007) (citing Susan O. Scheutzow & Sylvia Lynn Gillis,
Confidentiality and Privilege of Peer Review Information: More Imagined than Real, 7 J.L. &
HEALTH 169, 169 (1992–93)).
30. See Lisa M. Nijm, Note, Pitfalls of Peer Review: The Limited Protections of State and
Federal Peer Review Law for Physicians, 24 J. LEGAL MED. 541, 543 (2003).
31. Susan O. Scheutzow, State Medical Peer Review: High Cost but No Benefit—Is It Time
for a Change?, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 14 (1999).
32. See id.
33. Laura V. Yaeger, Note, Amendment 7: Medical Tradition v. The Will of the People: Has
Florida’s Peer Review Privilege Vanished?, 13 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 123, 124 (2009).
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necessary.34 The process creates a higher standard of quality of care by
weeding out “incompetence in the medical profession.”35
Peer review supporters assert that three main premises underlie the
strength of the peer review process.36 First, physicians are best situated,
due to their specialized training, to evaluate and observe other physicians’
practice methods and potential risks.37 Second, the candid evaluation and
criticism of fellow medical providers is the best way to determine subpar
and superlative care.38 Third, peer review motivates participants to
maintain a high standard of care within their medical practice.39 Hence, the
peer review process promotes learning from providers’ past medical errors
and “near misses,” rather than assigning blame to individuals.40 This strong
belief in the peer review process is evidenced by the fact that hospitals
must have a peer evaluation system in place in order to receive
accreditation by the Joint Commission (formerly known as the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations).41 The peer
review process is thus “one of medicine’s most effective risk management
and quality improvement tools.”42

34. Johns, supra note 19, at 1.
35. Alissa Marie Bassler, Comment, Federal Law Should Keep Pace with States and
Recognize a Medical Peer Review Privilege, 39 IDAHO L. REV. 689, 692 (2003) (citing Nilavar v.
Mercy Health Sys.-W. Ohio, 210 F.R.D. 597, 600 (S.D. Ohio 2002)).
36. See Ilene N. Moore et al., Rethinking Peer Review: Detecting and Addressing Medical
Malpractice Claims Risk, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1175, 1177–78 (2006).
37. See id. (“Peer review offers an incentive for similarly trained physicians working in the
same environment to identify colleagues with knowledge gaps or deficiencies in technical skills,
facilitate their remediation, and monitor their progress and performance, in preference to external
parties assuming this responsibility.”).
38. See id. at 1177; see also Eric Scott Bell, Comment, Make Way: Why Arkansas and the
States Should Narrow Health Care Peer Review Privileges for the Patient Safety and Quality
Improvement Act of 2005, 62 ARK. L. REV. 745, 749–54 (2009).
39. See Moore et al., supra note 36, at 1177; see also Bell, supra note 38, at 752–53.
40. See Patricia A. Sullivan & Jon M. Anderson, The Health Care Debate: If Lack of Tort
Reform Is Part of the Problem, Federalized Protection for Peer Review Needs to Be Part of the
Solution, 15 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 41, 47 (2010). It is argued that this blame game persistent
in medical malpractice litigation and the tort system has become a reason for providers to conceal
medical mistakes and “near misses.” Id. at 44 (quoting Bryan A. Liang & Steven D. Small,
Communicating About Care: Addressing Federal-State Issues in Peer Review and Mediation to
Promote Patient Safety, 3 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 219, 220–21, 223 (2003)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
41. See Scheutzow & Gillis, supra note 29, at 172–73; see also Christopher S. Morter, Note,
The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986: Will Physicians Find Peer Review More
Inviting?, 74 VA. L. REV. 1115, 1116–18 (1988). Although the Joint Commission is a
nongovernmental, voluntary private accreditation association, it is very influential because both
state and federal governments rely on Joint Commission accreditation for hospital licensure as well
as Medicare and Medicaid hospital programs. FURROW ET AL., supra note 1, at 149.
42. Nijm, supra note 30, at 541.
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II. AMENDMENT 7: PATIENTS’ RIGHT TO KNOW ABOUT ADVERSE
MEDICAL INCIDENTS
A. Florida’s Peer Review Protections Before Amendment 7
Before the passage of Amendment 7, the Florida Legislature and the
state’s courts long recognized the importance of affording confidentiality
and privilege protections43 to peer review reports in order to maintain the
quality of healthcare for patients throughout the state.44 Florida statutes
additionally privileged other medical review systems such as credentialing,
medical review committees, and risk management.45 Florida enacted a peer
review statute before the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986
(HCQIA)46 introduced national standards for peer review.47 Under
Florida’s statutory protections,48 medical peer review records were
confidential, privileged, and excluded from discovery.49 The protection of
43. Confidentiality and privilege are two separate legal concepts. Under confidentiality
protections, parties must refrain from disclosing information discussed in the peer review process
outside a judicial proceeding. See id. at 548; see also Storch, supra note 29, at 276–77. Privilege
protections safeguard particular information from disclosure during discovery or at trial. Nijm,
supra note 30, at 546. Privileged information will often also be considered confidential information.
See id. at 548.
44. Sawran & Weill, supra note 20, at 8–9.
45. Matthew, supra note 20, at 351 n.108. For examples of these statutory protections, see
infra note 48.
46. Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3784
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101–52 (2006)). The HCQIA “granted immunity to peer review
committee members” and required healthcare providers “to report physician misconduct to the
National Practitioner’s Data Bank.” Bell, supra note 38, at 751–52. In addition to the HCQIA’s
purpose to improve the quality of healthcare, the HCQIA was also created “to restrict the ability of
incompetent physicians to move from State to State without disclosure or discovery of the
physician’s previous damaging or incompetent performance.” 42 U.S.C. § 11101(2). Generally,
courts do not find that the HCQIA enacts a broad privilege protecting the non-discoverability of
peer review reports. See KD ex rel. Dieffenbach v. United States, 715 F. Supp. 2d 587, 594–96 (D.
Del. 2010).
47. Christina M. Graham, Comment, Hide and Seek: Discovery in the Context of the State
and Federal Peer Review Privileges, 30 CUMB. L. REV. 111, 125 (2000) (citing FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 766.101(5) (West 1997)).
48. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 395.0191 (2010) (requiring hospitals to create credentialing rules
and granting discovery protection for credentialing records); id. § 395.0193 (requiring mandatory
peer review for hospitals and protecting any peer review records from disclosure); id. § 395.0197
(requiring hospitals to create “an internal risk management program” that includes the production of
confidential, non-discoverable reports of adverse incidents); id. § 400.118 (requiring nursing homes
to conduct quality-of-care monitoring reports); id. § 459.016 (providing confidentiality and nondiscoverability protections to disciplinary reports by medical organizations); id. § 766.101(5)
(protecting a medical review committee’s investigations, proceedings, and records from discovery
and evidence); id. § 766.1016(2) (protecting patient safety data).
49. See Florida Peer Review After Amendment 7: Challenges and Solutions to a National
Trend, FOLEY & LARDNER LLP, 1–3 (May 5, 2008), http://www.foley.com/abc.aspx?Publication
=5012 [hereinafter Florida Peer Review After Amendment 7].
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peer review reports was “based on a conventional belief that the medical
profession could not deliver first-class healthcare without a high level of
self-oversight, coupled with near bulletproof immunity from discovery of
behind-the-scenes activities related to these pursuits.”50 These protections
encouraged physicians “to be candid and vigorous in the performance
evaluations of their peers, without fear that those evaluations would be
used for improper purposes,” such as medical malpractice suits.51 Thus, the
“rationale for cloaking peer review . . . in confidentiality” follows from the
need to promote full candor among peer review participants in order to
improve, or at least maintain, the quality of healthcare.52
As states began to enact peer review privilege statutes in the 1970s and
1980s,53 Florida courts led the way with an expansive approach to peer
review protections.54 Florida courts saw confidentiality protections as
integral to improving the quality of healthcare for patients statewide.55
Thus, courts “firmly guarded”56 the state’s various peer review protection
statutes. In Holly v. Auld,57 the Florida Supreme Court provided an
economic justification for the peer review privilege, stating, “In an effort to
control the escalating cost of healthcare in the state, the legislature deemed
it wise to encourage a degree of self-regulation by the medical profession
through peer review and evaluation.”58 The Holly court additionally
emphasized the need for confidentiality in peer review in order to provide
for “full, frank medical peer evaluation.”59
Eight years later, in Cruger v. Love,60 the Florida Supreme Court
reaffirmed its expansive view of peer review protection in order to
50. Harris, supra note 26, at 20.
51. Florida Peer Review After Amendment 7, supra note 49, at 1.
52. Sawran & Weill, supra note 20, at 9.
53. See Bell, supra note 38, at 751.
54. See Graham, supra note 47, at 125.
55. See Dade Cnty. Med. Ass’n v. Hlis, 372 So. 2d 117, 120 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979)
(“Confidentiality is essential to effective functioning of these staff meetings; and these meetings are
essential to the continued improvement in the care and treatment of patients. Candid and
conscientious evaluation of clinical practices is a sine quo non of adequate hospital care. To subject
these discussions and deliberations to the discovery process, without a showing of exceptional
necessity, would result in terminating such deliberations.” (quoting Bredice v. Doctors Hosp., Inc.,
50 F.R.D. 249, 250 (D.D.C. 1970), aff’d mem., 479 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1973)) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
56. Yaeger, supra note 33, at 126.
57. 450 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 1984). In Holly, a plaintiff physician filed a defamation claim against
another physician for the physician’s statements to the credentialing committee regarding the
plaintiff’s staff privileges. The plaintiff sought discovery of these credentialing records. Id. at 218.
58. Id. at 219–20.
59. Id. at 220.
60. 599 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 1992). In Cruger, the plaintiff brought a claim against the defendant
physician for alleged negligent treatment of the plaintiff’s son’s fractured thumb. The plaintiff
sought discovery of three local hospitals’ records regarding the defendant’s application for staff
privileges. Id. at 112.
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“prohibit the chilling effect of the potential public disclosure of statements
made to or information prepared for and used by the committee in carrying
out its peer review function.”61 The court explained that this “chilling
effect”62 causes doctors, absent peer review protection, “to be reluctant to
engage in strict peer review due to a number of apprehensions: loss of
referrals, respect, and friends; possible retaliations; vulnerability to torts;
and fear of malpractice actions in which the records of the peer review
proceedings might be used.”63 The court held that a privilege protection
statute applied to any documents that were reviewed by a hospital board or
committee during its peer-review process, including a physician’s
application for staff privileges.64 The court reasoned that full disclosure of
a physician’s information in an application is pertinent to the determination
of staff privileges; without this statutory protection, a physician would be
reluctant to engage in full, detailed reporting because of his fear that the
reported information may be used against him in the future.65 Thus, under
the Cruger court’s broad interpretation, “essentially all [peer review]
documents are privileged.”66
B. The Enactment of Amendment 7
As the Florida Legislature and the state’s courts continued to protect
the peer review process, the war between doctors and plaintiffs’ attorneys,
which had waged since the 1990s, culminated at the November 2, 2004
general election.67 Amendment 7 made it onto the ballot due to the efforts
of a movement by plaintiffs’ attorneys to “open up to public scrutiny a
medical community cloistered behind a veil of secrecy.”68 The state
statutory protections, advocates of Amendment 7 argued, “crowned the
medical profession with an almost unlimited degree of authority, not only
to regulate itself, but to conduct clandestine deliberations involving peer
review.”69 Sponsored by Floridians for Patient Protection70 and supported
61. Id. at 115.
62. Id.
63. Id. (quoting Gregory S. Gosfield, Comment, Medical Peer Review Protection in the
Health Care Industry, 52 TEMP. L.Q. 552, 558 (1979)).
64. Id. at 114.
65. Id.
66. Yaeger, supra note 33, at 126.
67. See Harris, supra note 26, at 20; see also Greg Groeller, Doctor-Lawyer Tussle Plays out
Before Voters, ORLANDO SENT., Oct. 27, 2004, at B1; Bob LaMendola, Doctors, Lawyers Lock
Horns over 3 Ballot Questions, SUN-SENT. (Fort Lauderdale, Fla.), Oct. 20, 2004, at 1A.
68. Sawran & Weill, supra note 20, at 12 n.5 (internal quotation marks omitted).
69. Harris, supra note 26, at 20. Amendment 7 proponents argued that the self-policing nature
of peer review created “an aura of controversy . . . surround[ing] the idea of allowing health care
personnel to police themselves in order to ensure high quality patient care.” Morter, supra note 41,
at 1115.
70. Patients’ Right to Know About Adverse Medical Incidents, DIV. ELECTIONS, FLA. DEP’T
STATE, http://election.dos.state.fl.us/initiatives/initdetail.asp?account=35169&seqnum=3 (last
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by the Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers,71 Amendment 7 was titled the
“Patients’ Right to Know About Adverse Medical Incidents.”72 The ballot
summary read:
Current Florida law restricts information available to patients
related to investigations of adverse medical incidents, such as
medical malpractice. This amendment would give patients the
right to review, upon request, records of health care facilities’
or providers’ adverse medical incidents, including those
which could cause injury or death. Provides that patients’
identities should not be disclosed.73
Proponents advocated Amendment 7 as a consumer information and
protection measure,74 claiming that it would provide Florida patients with
information about doctors, hospitals, and healthcare providers statewide;
patients would no longer have to base their decision primarily on the word
of mouth of the type of care rendered by these providers.75
However, in light of the underlying war between doctors and attorneys,
Amendment 7 was often referred to by its opponents as a “tit for tat”76
amendment, created in response to Amendment 3’s proposal77 “to limit
plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees.”78 This accusation is based on the fact that
Amendment 7 enables plaintiffs’ attorneys to access peer review’s candid
criticism of the delivery of care in order to achieve higher settlements and
verdicts.79
visited Jan. 29, 2012).
71. See Killian, supra note 27.
72. Patients’ Right to Know About Adverse Medical Incidents, supra note 70.
73. Id.
74. See Harris, supra note 26, at 21; see also Killian, supra note 27; Robert C. Weill, Buster
and the Continuing Saga over the Patients’ Right-to-Know-About-Medical-Incidents-Amendment,
TRIAL ADVOC. Q., Winter 2009, at 14, 14.
75. Sawran & Weill, supra note 20, at 7 n.5 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
76. Killian, supra note 27 (quoting Florida Supreme Court Justice Barbara Pariente) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
77. Pursuant to Amendment 3, the claimant in a medical liability case with a contingency fee
will receive no less than 70% of the first $250,000 and 90% of all damages in excess of that
amount, exclusive of customary and reasonable costs and regardless of the number of defendants.
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 26.
78. Sawran & Weill, supra note 20, at 7; see also Matthew, supra note 20, at 350–51 (“Many
defense lawyers and health care professionals actually believe the amendment was proposed in
direct response to Amendment 3. Metaphorically speaking, the electorate inadvertently supported
Amendment 7 which treats the disease (tort reform hindering plaintiff attorneys) instead of the
patient (health care as a whole).” (footnote omitted)); Michael A. Wasylik, Keep Our Best Doctors,
TAMPA TRIB., Oct. 27, 2004, at 11 (“Amendments 7 and 8 are intimidation tactics by the trial
lawyers in response to Amendment 3.”).
79. See Sullivan & Anderson, supra note 40, at 42.
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During oral arguments and review of the proposed amendment in June
2004,80 the Florida Supreme Court questioned the proponents of
Amendment 7 regarding voters’ understanding of the amendment—
namely, that they would not understand that the amendment would, in
effect, allow for all medical records to be public.81 In response, counsel for
Floridians for Patient Protection stated, “‘[T]he average voters of
reasonable intelligence’ will understand the chief purpose of the
amendment is to make medical records available.”82 Amendment 7 seemed
to provide a helpful method of gaining access to information critical for
potential lawsuits.83 Amendment 7’s proponents downplayed the proposed
amendment’s effect on the peer review privilege.84 The Florida Dental
Association, which opposed the amendment, expressed concern that the
ballot summary failed to inform voters of the effect and impact on
Florida’s peer review system.85 However, in its Advisory Opinion
regarding Amendment 7, the Florida Supreme Court stated that even if
Amendment 7 could impact the peer review process, “[i]t cannot be said
that the lack of a prediction as to the amendment’s effect on the peer
review statutes misleads the public as to the chief purpose of the
amendment.”86 After receiving the requisite number of signatures87 and
gaining the approval of the Florida Supreme Court,88 Amendment 7 was
added to the November 2, 2004 ballot.
Doctors throughout the state lobbied against Amendment 7; they
argued that peer review protection is necessary to maintain a high quality
of healthcare for Florida patients.89 Major newspapers throughout Florida
80. See Killian, supra note 27.
81. Justice Charles T. Wells raised this concern during the argument. Id.
82. Id. (quoting attorney Timothy McLendon).
83. See Matthew, supra note 20, at 351.
84. See id.
85. Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Patients’ Right to Know About Adverse Med. Incidents,
880 So. 2d 617, 622 (Fla. 2004).
86. Id.
87. In order to be placed on the ballot, Amendment 7 was required to have 488,722
signatures. Patients’ Right to Know About Adverse Medical Incidents, supra note 70. Amendment 7
proponents received an estimated 519,838 signatures. Id.
88. Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Patients’ Right to Know About Adverse Med. Incidents,
supra note 85, at 618.
89. See Dennis S. Agliano, Protect Your Health Care, TAMPA TRIB., Oct. 10, 2004, at 1
(“Amendment 7, the so-called Patient’s Right to Know amendment, will destroy key measures in
place to help Florida’s patients. Adverse incident reports have always been under the confidentiality
of the peer review committee, which is extremely important for quality assurance and patient safety.
Vote no on 7.”); LaMendola, supra note 67 (“But doctors and hospitals argue that the complaints
often prove groundless, and if aired, could unfairly tarnish reputations. They say going public
would kill the well-established process of ‘peer review,’ in which physician panels study deaths and
injuries in secret to learn how to prevent errors.”); Joseph D. Portoghese, The Hidden Agenda of
Amendment 7, ORLANDO SENT., Oct. 19, 2004, at A13 (“[T]he real intent of this amendment
is to open a hospital’s internal reviews of patient safety and quality-assurance efforts to
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also opposed Amendment 7.90 Despite this resistance, Amendment 7
passed with an overwhelming 81.2% of the vote on November 2, 2004.91
The Florida Constitution was subsequently amended to include
Amendment 7 in article X, section 25, which provides Florida patients with
“a right to have access to any records made or received in the course of
business by a health care facility or provider relating to any adverse
medical incident.”92 However, Amendment 7 conforms to the privacy
requirements of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of
1996 (HIPAA)93 by protecting patients’ identities from disclosure and
mandating adherence to all federal privacy restrictions.94
C. The Legislative and Judicial Responses to Amendment 7
The enactment of Amendment 7 “sparked a flurry of litigation in the
courts across Florida.”95 Within days of the November 2, 2004 election,
Floridians filed lawsuits and courts ordered injunctions in response to
Amendment 7.96 Opponents of Amendment 7 also “sought protection from
the Florida [L]egislature.”97 In June 2005, the Florida Legislature
implemented section 381.028.98 This statute attempted to limit Amendment
7’s broad scope in a number of ways.99 First, section 381.028 stated that
Amendment 7 was not retroactive; thus it applied only to adverse incident
reports created on or after November 2, 2004.100 Second, Amendment 7
trial attorneys for the purpose of lawsuits.”); Wasylik, supra note 78 (“The truth is, only the worst
doctors in our state will be in favor of Amendment 7, as it will reduce the internal hospital reviews
of medical errors that enable us to discipline unskilled physicians. . [sic] Peer review is the only
way for hospitals to immediately protect citizens from the unprofessional actions of bad doctors.”).
90. See Editorial, Limit Changes—Our Position: Only 2 of 8 Constitutional Amendments
Deserve Voter Support, ORLANDO SENT., Oct. 17, 2004, at G2; see also Editorial, The Tribune’s
Picks, TAMPA TRIB., Oct. 18, 2004, at 15; Editorial, Vote No on 3 Medical Issues, SUN-SENT. (Fort
Lauderdale, Fla.), Oct. 24, 2004, at 4J.
91. See supra Introduction and notes 20–26 and accompanying text (discussing the
November 2, 2004 General Election results).
92. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 25(a).
93. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110
Stat. 1936 (codified in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
94. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 25(b).
95. Johns, supra note 19, at 1.
96. See Coombs, supra note 23, at 394; see also Guy Boulton, Hospitals Tried to Pre-Empt
Malpractice Amendments, TAMPA TRIB., Nov. 6, 2004, at MONEYSENSE 1; Greg Groeller,
Medical Initiatives Already Face Suits: The Malpractice Amendments Likely Will Take a While to
Implement, Experts Say, ORLANDO SENT., Nov. 4, 2004, at A16.
97. Coombs, supra note 23, at 396.
98. The Florida Legislature first enacted this law as chapter 2005-265, Laws of Florida,
effective June 20, 2005. The law was codified as section 381.028 of the Florida Statutes in 2007.
See Fla. Hosp. Waterman, Inc. v. Buster, 984 So. 2d 478, 482 (Fla. 2008).
99. See Coombs, supra note 23, at 396; see also Weill, supra note 74, at 14; Florida Peer
Review After Amendment 7, supra note 49, at 1.
100. FLA. STAT. § 381.028(5).
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applied only to final reports and provided confidentiality and nondiscoverability protection to preliminary reports and other materials used
by review committees.101 Third, requesting patients were entitled only to
records that involved an incident concerning the same condition, diagnosis,
or treatment as their own.102 Fourth, any information received by a patient
was still subject to existing Florida statutes that protected against
admissibility and discovery.103
The enactment of Amendment 7 and section 381.028 resulted in a
conflict between two Florida District Courts of Appeal.104 In Florida
Hospital Waterman, Inc. v. Buster,105 the Florida Supreme Court addressed
this conflict and other issues surrounding Amendment 7.106 The court’s
ruling firmly solidified Amendment 7’s constitutional scope.107 First, the
court held that Amendment 7 is self-executing.108 Second, Amendment 7
applies retroactively to adverse medical incident reports in existence prior
to November 2, 2004.109 Third, several subsections of section 381.028
unconstitutionally impinged upon Amendment 7 and the court effectively
severed them from the statute.110 Regarding these conflicting subsections,
the Florida Supreme Court stated that section 381.028 could not limit
Amendment 7’s application to final reports because the amendment
applied to any records that relate to an adverse medical incident.
Additionally, the court stated that the statute could not limit patients’
records requests to records that involved an incident with the same
condition, diagnosis, or treatment as their own.111
101. Id. § 381.028(3)(j); see also Coombs, supra note 23, at 396.
102. FLA. STAT. § 381.028(7)(a).
103. Id. § 381.028(6); see also Coombs, supra note 23, at 396–97.
104. In Florida Hospital Waterman, Inc. v. Buster, the appellees sought production of
documents regarding the investigation of an adverse medical incident. 932 So. 2d 344, 348 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 2006). In Notami Hospital of Florida, Inc. v. Bowen, the appellees sought production
of documents regarding the selection, retention, or termination of a doctor. 927 So. 2d 139, 142
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2006). In both cases, the appellant hospitals argued that the information was
confidential and protected under various statutes in existence before Amendment 7. See Buster, 984
So. 2d 478, 482 (Fla. 2008). Florida’s Fifth District Court of Appeal held that Amendment 7 is selfexecuting and allows for discovery, but does not apply retroactively. Buster, 932 So. 2d at 356. The
First District also found that Amendment 7 is self-executing; in addition, that court held that
section 381.028 is unconstitutional. However, the First District held that Amendment 7 does apply
retroactively to existing records, creating the circuit conflict. Bowen, 927 So. 2d at 145.
105. 984 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 2008).
106. Id. at 480–81.
107. See Florida Peer Review After Amendment 7, supra note 49, at 1.
108. Buster, 984 So. 2d at 494.
109. Id. Section 381.028’s time limitation for records generated only after November 2, 2004
was severed as unconstitutional. Id. at 492–94.
110. Id. The Florida Supreme Court explained that any substantial limitation imposed by the
legislature on a right in an amendment is unconstitutional. Id. at 492.
111. Id.
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Demonstrating judicial deference to the citizen initiative process, the
Florida Supreme Court cited the lower court’s opinion to explain its
decision to uphold Amendment 7:
We believe that Amendment 7 heralds a change in the
public policy of this state to lift the shroud of privilege and
confidentiality in order to foster disclosure of information that
will allow patients to better determine from whom they
should seek health care, evaluate the quality and fitness of
health care providers currently rendering service to them, and
allow them access to information gathered through the selfpolicing processes during the discovery period of litigation
filed by injured patients or the estates of deceased patients
against their health care providers.112
In addition to supporting the voters, the court further explained that
healthcare providers had never been granted a vested substantive right for
peer review protection; they had simply expected that the Florida
Legislature would continue to protect the access and use of peer review
documents.113 The Florida Supreme Court’s 4–3 decision114 represented a
clear victory for Amendment 7. This ruling affected multiple Florida
statutes115 that had previously provided protection to peer review reports;
the Florida Supreme Court decisively concluded that Amendment 7
preempts all statutory peer review privileges in Florida.116

112. Id. at 494 (quoting Buster, 932 So. 2d 344, 348, 355–56 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2006))
(internal quotation marks omitted). The court continued to quote the Fifth District’s opinion to
explain:
We have come to this conclusion because we are obliged to interpret and apply
Amendment 7 in accord with the intention of the people of this state who enacted
it, and we have done so. It is not for us to judge the wisdom of the constitutional
amendments enacted or the change in public policy pronounced through those
amendments, even in instances where the change involves abrogation of longstanding legislation that establishes and promotes an equally or arguably more
compelling public policy.
Id. (quoting Buster, 932 So. 2d at 356) (internal quotation marks omitted).
113. Id. at 491.
114. Florida Peer Review After Amendment 7, supra note 49, at 1.
115. The affected statutes included Florida Statutes sections 395.0191(8), 395.0193(7),
395.0193(8), 395.0197(6)(c), 395.0197(7), 395.0197(9), 395.0197(11), 766.101(5), and
766.1016(2). Florida Peer Review After Amendment 7, supra note 49, at 1.
116. Buster, 984 So. 2d at 488–94; see also The Amendment 7 Challenge: Is a PSO Hype or
Hope?, FOLEY & LARDNER LLP, 6 (Apr. 29, 2008), http://www.foley.com/files/tbl_s88EventMat
erials/FileUpload587/1670/TheAmendment7.pdf [hereinafter The Amendment 7 Challenge]
(compiling materials from the firm’s program on the topic).
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Since the Buster decision, Amendment 7 continues to be a
controversial issue in Florida.117 Throughout the state, Florida courts have
varied in the application of Amendment 7.118 For instance, in October
2008, the Third District Court of Appeal restricted the reach of
Amendment 7 in Baptist Hospital of Miami, Inc. v. Garcia,119 while the
Fourth District Court of Appeal expanded Amendment 7’s scope in
Amisub North Ridge Hospital, Inc. v. Sonaglia.120 In Garcia, the Third
District restricted the full disclosure of a physician’s complete
credentialing files because the disclosure and production of the files would
reveal names and confidential information unrelated to adverse medical
incidents under Amendment 7.121 In contrast, in Sonaglia, the Fourth
District stated that Amendment 7 “does not require the information a
patient seeks to be relevant to a pending medical malpractice action or to a
medical care decision.”122
In Baldwin v. Shands Teaching Hospital & Clinics, Inc.,123 the First
District Court of Appeal further expanded the scope of Amendment 7.124
The court explained that an “adverse medical incident” under Amendment
7 means not only “medical negligence,” but also includes “intentional
misconduct, and any other act, neglect, or default of a health care facility
or health care provider that caused or could have caused injury to . . . a
patient.”125 If Amendment 7 only applies to incidents of medical
negligence, then to avoid falling under this rule, medical providers likely
would not label incidents as medical negligence.126
The controversy surrounding the scope and validity of Amendment 7
has continued well after the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the broad
scope of the amendment in Buster. Opponents of Amendment 7 have
challenged the amendment based on federal preemption by statutes that

117. See Weill, supra note 74, at 18 (describing unresolved issues surrounding Amendment 7
after the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Buster).
118. See Paula J. Parisi & Areti G. Tsitsakis, The Wake of Amendment 7: Moving Forward to
Protect Privileged Information, LITIG. Q. (Cole, Scott & Kissane, P.A., Fla.), June 1, 2009, at 11,
http://www.csklegal.com/wp-content/uploads/JuneQuarterly.pdf.
119. 994 So. 2d 390, 393 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
120. 995 So. 2d 999, 1001 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
121. 994 So. 2d at 393. The court reasoned that these files were statutorily privileged and
exempt from discovery under sections 395.0191(8) and 766.101(5), Florida Statutes. Id.
122. 995 So. 2d at 1001. The Fourth District thus permitted the production of peer review
records in a physician’s action against a fellow physician for defamation and tortious interference
with a business relationship. Id. at 1000–02.
123. 45 So. 3d 118 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
124. Id. at 120, 123–25.
125. Id. at 125 (quoting FLA. CONST. art. X, § 25(c)(3)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
126. Pursuant to Florida Statutes section 381.028(7)(b), healthcare providers are responsible
for the identification of records that are records of adverse medical incidents. See The Amendment 7
Challenge, supra note 116, at 12–13.
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require the confidentiality of certain records.127 However, Florida’s First
and Fourth District Courts of Appeal both decided in 2009 that neither the
HCQIA nor the federal Contracts Clause preempt Amendment 7.128
Therefore, despite these challenges, Amendment 7 remains in effect.
D. The Current Landscape Under Amendment 7
The recent rulings affirming Amendment 7’s broad scope will likely
have a significant impact on the peer review process in Florida.129 The
protective veil of confidentiality and privilege in Florida “has been ripped
away.”130 Experts predict that the loss of confidentiality and privilege
under Amendment 7 will negatively affect the quality of healthcare
statewide131 because healthcare providers will be reluctant to participate in
peer review.132 In 2002, 59% of physicians surveyed stated that fear of
liability was the primary reason they did not engage in open discussion of
patient injury cases.133 If physician participation in peer review does
diminish as predicted, Amendment 7 “threatens to eradicate all existing
protections for self-critical analysis.”134 Thus, Amendment 7 completely
undermines the legislative intent and public policy reasons behind previous
peer review statutes135 because without statutory protections, the peer
review process will be ineffective.136
In contrast, proponents of Amendment 7 can find support in similar
arguments made by critics of peer review protections. The peer review
process has been the subject of recent debate concerning whether it
actually promotes healthcare quality and safety.137 Critics of peer review
protection state that safety and quality issues often are not referred for peer

127. See Parisi & Tsitsakis, supra note 118, at 11–12.
128. See Columbia Hosp. Corp. of S. Broward v. Fain, 16 So. 3d 236, 241–44 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 2009); W. Fla. Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. See, 18 So. 3d 676, 684–88 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
2009).
129. See Coombs, supra note 23, at 401.
130. Yaeger, supra note 33, at 123.
131. Sawran & Weill, supra note 20, at 10.
132. Id.
133. HARRIS INTERACTIVE INC., FEAR OF LITIGATION STUDY: THE IMPACT ON MEDICINE 32
(2002), http://www.harrisinteractive.com/vault/Harris-Interactive-Poll-Research-Most-DoctorsReport-Fear-of-Malpractice-Liability-2002-05.pdf [hereinafter FEAR OF LITIGATION STUDY]
(reporting the results of a survey conducted for Common Good).
134. Sawran & Weill, supra note 20, at 8.
135. See Cruger v. Love, 599 So. 2d 111, 114 (Fla. 1992) (“While we recognized in Holly that
the discovery privilege would impinge upon the rights of litigants to obtain information helpful or
even essential to their cases, we assumed that the legislature balanced that against the benefits
offered by effective self-policing by the medical community.” (citing Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d
217, 220 (Fla. 1984))).
136. See Johns, supra note 19, at 1.
137. Moore et al., supra note 36, at 1182.
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review.138 In addition, they argue that peer review protections conceal
information that is often related to “contested issues in malpractice
cases.”139 Critics also argue that the peer review privilege has a negative
effect on disciplined physicians because a contesting physician is unable to
use the privileged peer review materials upon which his disciplinary action
is based in his defense.140 Some critics even allege that peer review
protections foster pettiness between competing physicians and encourage
them to make adverse peer review statements against each other.141 Others
argue that the peer review process results in physicians spending less time
with patients.142
Although “promoted as a consumer protection measure,”143
Amendment 7 predominantly has been used in medical malpractice
lawsuits; it has rarely been used in the service of investigative journalism
or as a check on doctors, hospitals, and health providers by the consumer
patient.144 Thus, the use of Amendment 7 as a “litigation tool”145 will result
in more medical malpractice lawsuits and greater healthcare costs.146
Florida is already plagued by a “medical malpractice crisis,” as evidenced
by the record number of recent verdicts against Florida hospitals.147 In
2004, Florida’s Second District Court of Appeal noted that “[m]edical
malpractice claims remain among the most intensively litigated in trial
practice.”148 Due to this crisis, malpractice insurance premiums have
drastically increased.149 As a result of these increasing insurance
138. See id. at 1186.
139. See id. at 1183; see also Bassler, supra note 35, at 695.
140. See Moore et al., supra note 36, at 1184–85.
141. See Sullivan & Anderson, supra note 40, at 49–50; see also Bassler, supra note 35, at
695.
142. See Sullivan & Anderson, supra note 40, at 50.
143. See Coombs, supra note 23, at 418; see also Killian, supra note 27.
144. Coombs, supra note 23, at 394–95. Healthcare providers’ performances and evaluations
are available through other means. For instance, the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB) has
information on adverse actions taken by licensing boards, medical malpractice payments and
settlements, and hospitals’ actions concerning clinical privileges. However, the general public
cannot access the NPDB. In Florida, the Practitioner Profile has information on licensed
practitioners (such as their education, staff privileges, and legal and disciplinary actions against
them). Yet, because providers themselves report a majority of the information, negative information
may be omitted. Id. at 418–19.
145. Sawran & Weill, supra note 20, at 7; see also Sullivan & Anderson, supra note 40, at 42
(“The problem is that peer review and medical malpractice litigation are in tension with each other
in that medical malpractice litigation feeds off candid criticism of care by converting peer review
into a tool to achieve higher verdicts and settlements in individual cases.”).
146. See Sawran & Weill, supra note 20, at 10.
147. Mike Segal, The Medical Malpractice Crisis: What’s Going on Here?, BROAD & CASSEL,
http://www.broadandcassel.com/articles/Mike%20Segal%20Medical%20Malpractice.pdf (last visited
Jan. 29, 2012).
148. Fassy v. Crowley, 884 So. 2d 359, 370 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
149. See Segal, supra note 147, at 1; see also FURROW ET AL., supra note 1, at 496; Mark V.
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premiums, healthcare providers will likely charge higher rates for their
services.150 Additionally, the increase in medical malpractice lawsuits has
affected physicians’ ability to provide quality healthcare; a 2002 report
found that 76% of physicians stated that their concern about medical
malpractice litigation has become detrimental to their ability to provide for
their patients.151 Therefore, it has been noted that Florida patients,
ironically, will suffer the most from Amendment 7 because of a decrease in
the quality of healthcare and an increase in healthcare costs.152
III. THE PATIENT SAFETY AND QUALITY IMPROVEMENT ACT (PSQIA)
A. History and Enactment
Congress passed the PSQIA153 in response to the startling findings of
the IOM Report.154 The IOM Report asserted that “the majority of medical
errors do not result from individual recklessness or the actions of a
particular group—this is not a ‘bad apple’ problem. More commonly,
errors are caused by faulty systems, processes, and conditions that lead
people to make mistakes or fail to prevent them.”155 In order to address
these systemic flaws, the report recommended that healthcare organizations
“develop and participate in voluntary reporting systems” nationwide.156
Thus, the release of the IOM Report in 1999 fueled the debate about the
need for a patient safety law.157
Pauly, Who Pays when Malpractice Premiums Rise?, in MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE U.S.
HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 71, 71 (William M. Sage & Rogan Kersh eds., 2006); Sullivan & Anderson,
supra note 40, at 41–42 (describing a debate regarding the degree to which medical malpractice
litigation has added substantial clinical and transactional costs). As a result of the recent spike in
medical malpractice insurance premiums, many physicians throughout the state have chosen to go
“bare” by practicing without insurance. Segal, supra note 147, at 1.
150. See Diana Furchtgott-Roth, The High Cost of Medical Malpractice, REAL CLEAR
MARKETS (Aug. 6, 2009), http://www.realclearmarkets.com/articles/2009/08/06/the_high_cost_of
_medical_malpractice_97346.html; Anne Underwood, Would Tort Reform Lower Costs?, N.Y.
TIMES: PRESCRIPTIONS BLOG (Aug. 31, 2009, 3:45 PM), http://prescriptions.blogs.nytimes.com/200
9/08/31/would-tort-reform-lower-health-care-costs/ (describing an agreement between Senators
Orrin G. Hatch (R-UT) and John Kerry (D-MA) that medical malpractice lawsuits are increasing
healthcare costs). But see TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH 3 (2005) (stating that
“the real costs of medical malpractice” are not due to litigation, but are a result of malpractice
victims’ lost lives, medical expenses, and time out of work).
151. FEAR OF LITIGATION STUDY, supra note 133, at 8.
152. See Sawran & Weill, supra note 20, at 10.
153. Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-41, 119 Stat. 424
(2005) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 299b-21 to -26 (2006)).
154. See Douglas B. Dotan, Patient Safety Organizations: A New Paradigm in Quality
Management and Communication Systems in Healthcare, 34 J. CLINICAL ENGINEERING 142, 142–43
(2009). For the IOM Report’s findings, see supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text.
155. TO ERR IS HUMAN SUMMARY, supra note 6, at 2.
156. Id. at 3.
157. See Bell, supra note 38, at 761.
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In 2000, Senator James Jeffords, an independent from Vermont,
introduced a patient safety law called the Patient Safety and Errors
Reduction Act.158 However, that Act failed to pass both houses.159 In 2005,
Senator Jeffords sponsored the PSQIA;160 it was signed into law on July
29, 2005.161 Despite a general acknowledgement of the value of the
PSQIA, skeptics questioned the Act’s ability to achieve its proposed
goals.162 These concerns regarded the PSQIA’s lack of firm requirements
ensuring the protection of confidential information, the high financial and
administrative costs of implementation, and the unclear relationship
between federal and state patient safety legislation.163 Despite this
skepticism, the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) of
the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) published the final
rule implementing the PSQIA on November 21, 2008.164 The Act then
became effective on January 19, 2009.165
Congress enacted the PSQIA to promote “a learning environment that
is needed to move beyond the existing culture of blame and punishment
that suppresses information about healthcare errors to a ‘culture of safety’
that focuses on information sharing, improved patient safety and quality
and the prevention of future medical errors.”166 Through the PSQIA,
Congress sought to improve patient safety and reduce the prevalence of
adverse medical incidents by encouraging voluntary peer review
participation167 without the fear of legal disclosure.168 The IOM Report
158. See Robert A. Kerr, Note, The Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005: Who
Should Pay for Improved Conditions?, 17 HEALTH MATRIX 319, 328 (2007); see also S. 2738,
106th Cong. (2000).
159. See Kerr, supra note 158, at 328.
160. S. 544: Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005, GOVTRACK.US.,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s109-544 (last visited Feb. 3, 2012).
161. See Key, supra note 7, at 24 (citing Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-41, 119 Stat. 424 (2005) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 299b-21 to -26 (2006))).
The PSQIA “received bipartisan support each year it was presented to Congress.” Kerr, supra note
158, at 327.
162. Mark A. Kadzielski & Lynsey A. Mitchel, An Analysis of the New Federal Patient Safety
Law and Final Rule, J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE, Mar.–Apr. 2009, at 5, 6. Much of this
skepticism occurred after the proposed rule implementing the Act was published on February 12,
2008. Id. at 6. Beginning February 12, 2008, and ending April 14, 2008 (the public notice-andcomment period), the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) provided sixty days for
public feedback and suggestions for revisions to the proposed rule. Id.
163. Id.
164. Patient Safety & Quality Improvement, 73 Fed. Reg. 70,732 (Nov. 21, 2008) (codified at
42 C.F.R. pt. 3 (2009)).
165. Id.
166. KD ex rel. Dieffenbach v. United States, 715 F. Supp. 2d 587, 595 (D. Del. 2010)
(quoting S. REP. NO. 108-196, at 3 (2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
167. See id.
168. See Carolyn M. Clancy, New Patient Safety Organizations Lower Roadblocks to Medical
Error Reporting, 23 AM. J. MED. QUALITY 318, 319 (2008).
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stated that the prevalence of medical errors could be explained by
healthcare providers’ reluctance to identify errors due to a fear that such
information would be used against them in medical malpractice lawsuits.169
Additional fears include adverse action by hospital disciplinary staff and
licensing boards, as well as potential injury to providers’ reputations.170
The PSQIA thus provides that data reported to a PSO are confidential and
privileged.171 Healthcare providers may create internal patient safety
evaluation systems (PSES) to facilitate the collection and analysis of
patient safety event data and can voluntarily report this information to a
PSO.172 By providing privilege and confidentiality protections through the
PSQIA, Congress envisioned a patient safety network that provides
interactive and evidence-based information to enable healthcare providers
to analyze and provide insight into patient safety events and systemic
failures.173
B. The Creation of Patient Safety Organizations and the Network of
Patient Safety Databases
A major objective of the PSQIA is the creation of PSOs. As a private
or public entity or a component of another organization (a component
organization), a PSO’s primary purpose is to conduct activities that
improve healthcare quality and patient safety.174 A PSO must be certified
and listed by the AHRQ.175 A listing lasts for three years; in order to
remain a PSO, the organization must apply for recertification.176 However,
certain entities cannot qualify as a PSO;177 excluded entities include any
health insurance issuer or component of an insurance issuer and any
healthcare oversight entity, such as an accreditation or licensing entity.178
A “provider” is defined as an individual or entity licensed by a state to
provide healthcare services.179 A PSO must work with more than one
provider.180 There are approximately eighty listed PSOs in roughly thirty
169. See TO ERR IS HUMAN, supra note 1, at 109–12.
170. See Key, supra note 7, at 24.
171. 42 U.S.C. § 299b-22(a)–(b) (2006); 42 C.F.R. §§ 3.204(a), 3.206(a) (2010); see also
Kadzielski & Mitchel, supra note 162, at 5.
172. See Kadzielski & Mitchel, supra note 162, at 5.
173. See id.
174. See Patient Safety Organizations Fast Facts, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY,
http://www.pso.ahrq.gov/psos/fastfacts.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2012) [hereinafter PSO Fast
Facts]; see also Key, supra note 7, at 25.
175. PSO Fast Facts, supra note 174.
176. 42 U.S.C. § 299b-24(a)(2) (2006); 42 C.F.R. § 3.102(a)(3) (2010).
177. Id. § 3.102(a)(2).
178. See id.; see also Key, supra note 7, at 25.
179. 42 C.F.R. § 3.20 (2010). Examples of providers include hospitals, nursing facilities,
physicians, physician assistants, registered nurses, physical or occupational therapists, pharmacists,
and certified social workers. Id.
180. 42 U.S.C. § 299b-24(b)(1)(C); 42 C.F.R. § 3.102(b)(2)(i)(C); see also Dotan, supra note
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states and the District of Columbia.181
In order to qualify as a PSO, an entity must meet fifteen general
certification requirements.182 These are divided into eight patient safety
activities and seven PSO criteria.183 The eight patient safety activities are:
(1) Efforts to improve patient safety and the quality of
health care delivery;
(2) The collection and analysis of patient safety work
product;
(3) The development and dissemination of information
with respect to improving patient safety, such as
recommendations, protocols, or information regarding best
practices;
(4) The utilization of patient safety work product for the
purposes of encouraging a culture of safety and of providing
feedback and assistance to effectively minimize patient risk;
(5) The maintenance of procedures to preserve
confidentiality with respect to patient safety work product;
(6) The provision of appropriate security measures with
respect to patient safety work product;
(7) The utilization of qualified staff; and
(8) Activities related to the operation of a patient safety
evaluation system and to the provision of feedback to
participants in a patient safety evaluation system.184
An entity must also certify the following seven PSO criteria:
(1) The mission and primary activity of the organization
are to conduct activities to promote patient safety and
improve the quality of health care delivery;
(2) The organization must demonstrate that it has
appropriately qualified staff;
(3) It must show that it has contracts with more than one
provider to receive and review PSWP;
(4) It must not be a health insurance issuer;
154, at 144. The multiple healthcare provider requirement guarantees that patient safety event
information is, in fact, being exchanged and analyzed in order for one provider to learn from
another provider’s experiences. See Clancy, supra note 168, at 319.
181. Geographic Directory, supra note 14.
182. 42 C.F.R. § 3.102(b).
183. Id.
184. 42 C.F.R. § 3.20 (2010).
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(5) It must disclose any financial, reporting, or contractual
relationship with providers, and whether it is managed,
controlled, and operated independently from any provider that
contracts with the entity;
(6) It must show that it collects PSWP in a standardized
manner; and
(7) It must show that it uses PSWP to provide direct
feedback and assistance to providers.185
In addition to the fifteen general PSO requirements, an organization
must also certify that it will (1) keep patient safety work product
(PSWP)186 separate from the parent organization; (2) not make any
unauthorized disclosures to the parent organization; and (3) not be in a
conflict of interest with the parent organization.187 The AHRQ is
responsible for administering the certification process for a PSO listing and
verifying that a PSO has met its requirements.188 The AHRQ works with a
PSO to help resolve compliance issues in order to avoid revoking a PSO’s
listing.189 However, if a PSO does not comply with the PSQIA
requirements, the AHRQ may revoke that PSO’s listing.190
The PSQIA additionally calls for the creation of a Network of Patient
Safety Databases (NPSD) in order to aggregate, analyze, and archive
patient safety information received from PSOs.191 The NPSD’s goal “is to
facilitate aggregation and analyses of patient safety event information to
help reduce adverse events and improve healthcare quality.”192 PSOs and
other entities, such as HHS and the Center for Medicare & Medicaid
Services, will voluntarily contribute non-identifiable PSWP to the
NPSD.193 The NPSD’s findings will be reported to Congress in the
AHRQ’s annual National Healthcare Quality Report.194 In order to
facilitate the sharing of information, data in the NPSD will conform to
185. 42 U.S.C. 299b-24(b)(1); 42 C.F.R. § 3.102(b)(2)(i); see also Key, supra note 7, at 27.
186. See infra notes 199–201 and accompanying text (defining PSWP).
187. 42 U.S.C. § 299b-24(b)(2); 42 C.F.R. § 3.102(c)(2); see also Key, supra note 7, at 27.
188. PSO Fast Facts, supra note 174.
189. See Clancy, supra note 168, at 320.
190. Id. As of early 2012 , there were thirty-three delisted PSOs. One PSO was delisted for
cause, and one PSO was delisted for expired listing. However, the rest of the delisted PSOs
voluntarily relinquished their listing. Delisted Patient Safety Organizations, AGENCY FOR
HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY, http://www.pso.ahrq.gov/delisted/delistedpsos.htm (last visited Jan.
21, 2012).
191. See Network of Patient Safety Databases, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY,
http://www.pso.ahrq.gov/npsd/npsd.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2012); see also Dotan, supra note
154, at 143–44.
192. Network of Patient Safety Databases, supra note 191.
193. See id.; see also Dotan, supra note 154, at 144.
194. Clancy, supra note 168, at 320.
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“common formats”—standardized definitions and reporting formats.195
The AHRQ initially anticipated that the NPSD would begin to receive PSO
information in 2010,196 yet in January 2010 it reported that the database
would not launch before February 2011.197 AHRQ is expected to release a
report featuring NPSD information in 2012.198 As the number of PSOs
continues to grow and they begin to submit their patient safety information
to the NPSD, the PSQIA will help increase the quality of healthcare by
analyzing trends in the delivery of care locally, regionally, and nationally.
C. Patient Safety Work Product and Patient Safety Evaluation Systems:
Privilege and Confidentiality Protections
PSWP is “any data, reports, records, memoranda, analyses (such as root
cause analyses), or written or oral statements” which: (1) are assembled or
created by a provider for PSO reporting and are reported to a PSO; (2) are
developed by a PSO in order to conduct patient safety activities; or (3)
identify the analysis of a PSES.199 PSWP does not include a patient’s
original patient, provider, medical record, billing, or discharge
information.200 Nor does a PSWP include information that is collected or
maintained separately from a PSES.201
PSWP is submitted to a provider’s patient safety evaluation system
(PSES).202 A PSES is “the collection, management, or analysis of
information for reporting to or by a [PSO].”203 A provider’s PSES is a
separate and secure physical and electronic space from the provider’s
internal risk management, which clearly specifies how and when a provider
will report information to its PSO and how such communication will
occur.204 PSWP may be removed from a PSES before it has been reported
to a PSO; after PSWP has been removed, it is no longer protected under
the PSQIA.205
195. See Network of Patient Safety Databases, supra note 191.
196. PSO Fast Facts, supra note 174.
197. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-281, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL
COMMITTEES: PATIENT SAFETY ACT: HHS IS IN THE PROCESS OF IMPLEMENTING THE ACT, SO ITS
EFFECTIVENESS CANNOT YET BE EVALUATED 13 (2010).
198. UHC Patient Safety Organization Featured in National Quality Forum State-Based
Reporting Group, UHC NEWS (Feb. 2011), https://www.uhc.edu/38712.htm.
199. 42 U.S.C. § 299b-21(7) (2006); 42 C.F.R. § 3.20 (2010).
200. 42 U.S.C. § 299b-21(7); 42 C.F.R. § 3.20.
201. 42 U.S.C. § 299b-21(7); 42 C.F.R. § 3.20; see also AM. MED. ASS’N, THE PHYSICIAN’S
GUIDE TO PATIENT SAFETY ORGANIZATIONS 21 (2009), available at http://www.amaassn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/370/patient-safety-organizations.pdf (illustrating the separation
between a provider’s internal risk-management system and PSES).
202. See AM. MED. ASS’N , supra note 201, at 10–11, 21.
203. 42 U.S.C. § 299b-21(6); 42 C.F.R. § 3.20.
204. AM. MED. ASS’N, supra note 201, at 10, 21 (illustrating the separation between a
provider’s internal risk-management system and PSES).
205. Id. at 14; see also 42 C.F.R. § 3.20.
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The PSQIA provides privilege protections to PSWP.206 PSWP is not
discoverable pursuant to a federal or state “civil, criminal or administrative
subpoena or order.”207 Additionally, PSWP is neither discoverable nor
admissible in a federal or state “civil, criminal or administrative
proceeding,” including an “administrative proceeding against a
provider.”208 PSWP is also inadmissible in a proceeding by a professional
disciplinary board authorized by state law.209 Exceptions to PSWP
privilege are permitted for the disclosure: (1) of PSWP relevant to a
criminal proceeding; 210 (2) “to provide equitable relief in a private cause of
action”;211 (3) after receiving authorization from each provider;212 and (4)
“of non-identifiable PSWP.”213 PSWP privilege under the PSQIA is
determined and enforced by the court in which the PSWP evidence is
presented.214 The PSQIA is not a broad federal peer review privilege;
instead, Congress created a limited and narrow exception for peer review
privilege for PSWP created under PSOs.215
In addition to privilege protections, the PSQIA also provides
confidentiality protections. PSWP is confidential and not subject to
disclosure.216 Exceptions to PSWP confidentiality are permitted for the
disclosure: (1) of relevant PSWP in a criminal proceeding after an in
camera inspection by the court; (2) to provide equitable relief under the
Public Health Act; (3) after receiving authorization from identified
providers; (4) to perform patient safety activities; (5) of non-identifiable
PSWP; (6) for research; (7) to the Food and Drug Administration; (8) to an
accrediting entity; (9) for business operations; and (10) to law
enforcement.217 If the disclosing entity is not a PSO, the disclosure of
PSWP is not a confidentiality violation if the PSWP does not include
information that either “assesses the quality of care of a provider” or
“describe[s] or pertain[s] to one or more actions or failures . . . by a
provider.”218 The Office of Civil Rights is responsible for the
administration and enforcement of PSWP’s confidentiality protections; it
investigates all allegations of violations based on “a complaint-driven
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
2008).
216.
217.
218.

42 C.F.R. § 3.204(a).
Id. § 3.204(a)(1).
Id. § 3.204(a)(2), (a)(4).
Id. § 3.204(a)(5).
Id. § 3.204(b)(1).
Key, supra note 7, at 26; 42 C.F.R. § 3.204(b)(2).
42 C.F.R. § 3.204(b)(3); see also Key, supra note 7, at 26.
Key, supra note 7, at 26; 42 C.F.R. § 3.204(b)(4).
See Key, supra note 7, at 27.
Schlegel v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 2008 WL 4570619, at *3–4 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 14,
42 U.S.C. § 299b-22(b) (2006); 42 C.F.R. § 3.206(a).
Id. § 3.206(b).
Id. § 3.206(c).
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system.”219 For each disclosure of confidential PSWP, the HHS Secretary
may impose a civil penalty of up to $10,000 against any PSO, provider, or
individual.220 While a PSO must also comply with HIPAA requirements,221
the same violation for a disclosure of confidential information cannot cause
a PSO to be subject to penalties under both the PSQIA and HIPAA.222
If PSWP has been disclosed, it remains privileged and confidential
unless the disclosure is in a criminal proceeding (in which case PSWP is
still privileged, but is no longer confidential) or the disclosure is of nonidentifiable PSWP (in which case PSWP is no longer privileged or
confidential).223 PSQIA privilege protections preempt all federal, state, and
local laws that would otherwise limit the protection of PSWP; however,
any federal, state, or local law that provides more confidentiality and
privilege protection than PSQIA is permissible.224 In contrast to the
HCQIA’s narrow protection for peer review activities affecting individual
physicians, the PSQIA provides a broad protection for all PSWP.225
D. The Judicial Response to and the Future of the PSQIA
Since 2005, few cases have involved the PSQIA. In 2008, in a
California case, Schlegel v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan et al.,226 the
defendant healthcare company argued that the PSQIA created a broad
federal peer review privilege and objected to the plaintiff’s request for
production of peer review documents relating to an investigation of the
defendant’s transplant program.227 The court stated that the PSQIA created
a limited, narrow exception for peer review privilege for PSWP; it is not “a
broad federal peer review privilege.”228 The court refused to apply the
PSQIA’s privilege protections because there was no evidence that the
contested documents were prepared for or reported to a PSO by the
defendant. The court additionally pointed out that none of the defendant
entities was a listed PSO itself.229

219. PSO Fast Facts, supra note 174. A complaint must be filed with the HHS Secretary
within 180 days of when the complainant knew or should have known of a violation. 42 C.F.R.
§ 3.306. There is a six-year statute of limitations for a violation under the PSQIA. Id. § 3.414.
220. PSO Fast Facts, supra note 174.
221. Id.
222. 42 C.F.R. § 3.418.
223. Id. § 3.208.
224. Key, supra note 7, at 26.
225. See KD ex rel. Dieffenbach v. United States, 715 F. Supp. 2d 587, 594–96 (D. Del.
2010).
226. 2008 WL 4570619, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2008).
227. Id. at *1–2.
228. Id. at *3.
229. Id.
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In contrast, a Delaware court, in KD ex rel. Dieffenbach v. United
States,230 prevented the disclosure of peer review documents by the
National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute of the National Institutes of
Health even though the review bodies may not have met “the technical
requirements for listing as PSOs.”231 That court reasoned even if the
defendant review bodies did not meet the technical requirements for a
listed PSO, “they clearly perform the same functions Congress intended the
PSQIA to encourage.”232 The court further explained that the defendant’s
review process “collects the same kind of safety data as enumerated in the
PSQIA, within the same organizational structure, to accomplish the same
goal (i.e., ensuring participant safety and effectiveness of care).”233
Additionally, the Dieffenbach court stated that, as compared to the HCQIA,
the PSQIA “announces a more general approval of the medical peer review
process and more sweeping evidentiary protections for materials used
therein.”234 The court explained that while the HCQIA was created to
restrict physicians from moving across states without disclosing their
previous performances, the PSQIA was implemented to address
healthcare’s systemic weaknesses that result in preventable adverse
medical incidents.235
While PSQIA case law currently remains limited, litigation involving
the PSQIA will likely increase in the coming years due to the growing
number of PSOs.236 PSOs have recently been listed as one of the top ten
issues in health law.237 As the scope of the PSQIA remains undecided
within the judicial system, the functioning and application of the PSQIA is
in the hands of healthcare providers.238 Joining a PSO and submitting
information to the NPSD are voluntary acts.239 Therefore, for the PSQIA to
have a beneficial effect on the healthcare system, healthcare providers must
actively participate by willingly submitting patient safety information and
learning from the data to improve the quality of healthcare.240

230. 715 F. Supp. 2d 587 (D. Del. 2010).
231. Id. at 588–90, 596–98.
232. Id. at 596.
233. Id. at 597.
234. Id. at 595.
235. Id.
236. See supra text accompanying note 181 (describing the approximate number of listed
PSOs).
237. Molly Merrill, Top 10 Health Law Issues for 2010, HEALTHCARE IT NEWS (Feb. 19,
2010), http://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/top-ten-health-law-issues-2010.
238. See Clancy, supra note 168, at 319 (“Health care providers will make the key decisions
about how this system will work in practice.”).
239. Id. at 319. Providers also choose what information they will submit to a PSO or the
NPSD. Id.
240. Id. at 319–20.
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IV. WILL THE PSQIA BE THE CURE TO AMENDMENT 7?
A. Amendment 7 and the PSQIA
Although Amendment 7 remains in full effect, Florida healthcare
practitioners are well aware that the scope of its application is limited to
records.241 Amendment 7 has not removed many of the legal protections
against disclosure of peer reviewers’ identity, compelling of testimony, and
use of litigation information.242 Yet, the peer review process in Florida
remains in potential peril.
Effective confidentiality and privilege protections are essential to peer
review reporting in order to address medical errors.243 Thus, critics of
Amendment 7 suggest that the PSQIA may provide protection from
Amendment 7’s broad scope.244 Still, the interplay between Amendment 7
and the PSQIA remains unknown.245 While Amendment 7 has been
(unsuccessfully) challenged based on federal preemption, these federal
claims included alleged conflict with the HCQIA, the Contracts Clause,
and HIPAA; however, Amendment 7 has not yet been challenged as being
federally preempted by the PSQIA.246

241. See Parisi & Tsitsakis, supra note 118, at 11–12.
242. Memorandum, Benedict & Assoc., Inc., Peer Review in Florida Since Constitutional
Amendment 7 Passed, available at http://www.benedictriskmanagement.com/docs/Peer_review_060
62006.pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 2012).
243. See Key, supra note 7, at 27.
244. See Coombs, supra note 23, at 418 (“[T]he Patient Safety & Quality Improvement Act of
2005 may provide federal protection against discoverability for at least some of these records.”); see
also Parisi & Tsitsakis, supra note 118, at 12 (“[The PSQIA] could form the basis for a preemptive
challenge to Amendment 7.”); Yaeger, supra note 33, at 149 (“Since the passage of Amendment 7,
more hospitals may choose to voluntarily report patient safety work product to patient safety
organizations to benefit from the federal privilege and confidentiality.”); The Amendment 7
Challenge, supra note 116 (asking whether a PSO is hype or hope in reference to Amendment 7);
Florida Peer Review After Amendment 7, supra note 49, at 3 (“[H]ospitals and hospital systems
should consider establishing their own PSO to receive their PSWP.”); Welcome, MED. PEER REV.
RES., LLC, http://www.medicalpeerreviewresource.com/index.php (last visited Oct. 30, 2011)
[hereinafter MPRR] (“The PSO can provide Florida physicians and healthcare providers with
[Amendment 7] protection.”).
245. While the interplay between Amendment 7 and PSQIA has not yet been determined in the
courts, the Medical Peer Review Resource, LLC PSO states on its website that “all patient safety
work product is privileged and confidential under federal law, which trumps state law, including
Amendment 7.” MPRR, supra note 244.
246. See Columbia Hosp. Corp. of S. Broward v. Fain, 16 So. 3d 236, 241–44 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 2009); see also W. Fla. Reg. Med. Ctr. v. See, 18 So. 3d 676, 684–88 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 2009); Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at 20–26, 37–40, Fla. Hosp. Ass’n v.
Viamonte, 2008 WL 5101755 (N.D. Fla. July 10, 2008) (No. 4:08-cv-312-RH/WCS), ECF No. 1;
Harris, supra note 26, at 27 n.77.
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B. How to Become a Patient Safety Organization in Florida
The AHRQ accepts applications for PSO listings at any time; there is
no application deadline.247 Applicants are able to access all of the requisite
forms and information from the AHRQ website.248 An applicant can either
join an existing PSO or create a new PSO by joining with other entities. Of
the approximate eighty listed PSOs, there are about eight in Florida.249
However, this does not mean that Florida healthcare providers are
restricted to joining a Florida PSO as PSOs are composed of members
from various states.250
The PSQIA creates confidentiality and privilege protections for PSWP
submitted to a PSO.251 However, if the PSWP contains any information
that must be reported to the state, then that information cannot be protected
under the PSQIA.252 Pursuant to Florida Statutes section 395.0197, a
licensed facility’s internal risk-management program is required to submit
adverse incident reports to the Agency for Health Care Administration:
annually, for certain categories of incidents (annual reports); and within
fifteen days of the occurrence, for other statutorily defined incidents (Code
15 reports).253 Therefore, neither annual reports nor Code 15 reports are
protected as PSWP under the PSQIA, even if they are submitted to a
PSO.254 In contrast, while both Florida255 and the Joint Commission256
require that healthcare providers have a peer review system, the state does
not require the reporting of peer review documents,257 which thus remain
protected as PSWP. Therefore, when creating a PSO in Florida, it is
important to recognize that Code 15 and annual adverse incident reports
are not protected PSWP and that the PSES is a separate system from the

247. PSO Fast Facts, supra note 174.
248. See Patient Safety Organization Forms, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY,
http://www.pso.ahrq.gov/listing/psoforms.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2012); see also Patient Safety
Organization Listing Information, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY,
http://www.pso.ahrq.gov/listing/listprocess.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2012).
249. Geographic Directory, supra note 14.
250. For instance, the UHC Patient Safety Net (PSN) PSO has approximately 100 participating
organizations and more than 800 nationwide “Patient Safety Leaders” on its “PSN
Quality/Risk/Safety Listserve.” Highlights of the Patient Safety Net Program, UNITED HEALTH SYS.
CONSORTIUM, https://www.uhc.edu/docs/49013841_PSNhighlights.pdf (last visted Sept. 25, 2011).
Officially listed on November 5, 2008, and registered in Illinois, UHC PSN is a component entity of
the University HealthSystem Consortium. Geographic Directory, supra note 14.
251. See supra Section III.C.
252. 42 U.S.C. § 299b-21(7)(B) (2006).
253. FLA. STAT. § 395.0197(6)–(7); see also Reporting, FLA. AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE
ADMIN., http://www.fdhc.state.fl.us/SCHS/risk/reporting.shtml (last updated Jan. 31, 2011).
254. See 42 U.S.C. § 299b-21(7).
255. FLA. STAT. § 395.0193(2).
256. See supra Part I.
257. See FLA. STAT. § 395.0193(2).
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state-mandated internal risk-management program.258
C. Why Florida Healthcare Providers Should Join Patient Safety
Organizations
More than ten years after the publication of the IOM Report, the need
to address patient safety events remains vital. Recent studies indicate that
the number of adverse events has increased.259 A 2002 study stated that an
estimated 8.1 million Americans have “experienced a serious medical or
drug error.”260 As of 2010, one in seven hospitalized Medicare patients
experienced an adverse medical event; these events cause approximately
180,000 deaths a year.261 In November 2010, a study of ten North Carolina
hospitals reported, “[H]arms remain common, with little evidence of
widespread improvement. Further efforts are needed to translate effective
safety interventions into routine practice and to monitor healthcare safety
over time.”262 Dr. Carolyn M. Clancy, director of the AHRQ since 2003,
explained that the increase of adverse events is partly due to better tracking
and broader definitions of what are preventable incidents.263 Since the
publication of the IOM Report, healthcare providers have taken measures
to improve patient safety.264
One way that Florida healthcare providers can address the prevalence
of adverse events is by joining a PSO. As more Florida providers join the
approximately eight listed Florida PSOs and the other PSOs listed outside
of Florida,265 the quality of healthcare across the state will likely increase
because providers will no longer be afraid to participate in the peer review
process. If their adverse medical incident reports are PSWP under a listed
PSO, such reports would no longer be subject to Amendment 7. Florida
providers under a PSO will be able to engage in the type of candid,
specialized medical evaluation favored by the Holly and Cruger courts.266
The PSQIA provides PSWP protections in order to remove barriers, such
as Amendment 7, “that can deter the participation of health care providers
258. See AM. MED. ASS’N, supra note 201, at 21 (illustrating a depiction of the flow of
information between an internal risk-management program and a PSES).
259. Manoj Jain, Focus on Patient Safety Hasn’t Succeeded, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2010, at
E05.
260. New Study Estimates Eight Million American Families Experienced a Serious Medical or
Drug Error, COMMONWEALTH FUND (Apr. 15, 2002), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Content/
News/News-Releases/2002/Apr/New-Study-Estimates-Eight-Million-American-Families-Experie
nced-A-Serious-Medical-Or-Drug-Error.aspx.
261. Jain, supra note 259.
262. Christopher P. Landrigan et al., Temporal Trends in Rates of Patient Harm Resulting
from Medical Care, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2124, 2124 (2010).
263. Jain, supra note 259.
264. See Clancy, supra note 168, at 318; see also Jain, supra note 259.
265. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
266. See supra Section II.A (discussing Holly and Cruger).
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in patient safety and quality improvement initiatives, such as fear of legal
liability or professional sanctions.”267 However, a healthcare provider
cannot merely join a PSO in order to avoid falling under Amendment 7.
The primary mission and activity of a PSO must be to conduct activities to
improve healthcare quality and patient safety.268 A PSO should not be
viewed simply as a method to avoid Amendment 7; instead, healthcare
providers across Florida should join PSOs to counteract Amendment 7’s
effect on the peer review process. By sharing patient safety information
through the protections of a PSO, the quality of healthcare can be increased
throughout the state.
Thus, by joining a PSO, Florida healthcare providers will improve the
quality of healthcare not only by protecting the peer review process, but
also by analyzing and aggregating information submitted to PSOs. Dr.
Clancy described two roadblocks that have hindered the improvement of
the quality of healthcare since the IOM Report: the lack of uniform federal
confidentiality and privilege standards regarding patient safety event
information;269 and the inability of healthcare providers to share patient
safety data with other providers—locally, regionally and nationally—to
identify and analyze trends in order to reduce adverse medical events.270
The PSQIA addresses these two roadblocks by creating federal
confidentiality and privilege protections for PSWP as well as informationsharing entities through individual PSOs and the NPSD.
Similar to peer review’s use of medical expert evaluation, PSOs also
supply analysis and evaluation of patient safety events by medical
experts.271 The exchange of information within a PSO offers providers an
outside perspective on other providers’ systemic flaws; the peer review
process—conducted internally, within a provider’s system—is generally
unable to facilitate the same. Participation in a PSO enables providers to
learn from the experiences of other providers.272 Submitted information
can be aggregated to develop an understanding of the underlying causes
and trends of adverse events and near-misses at a local, regional, and
national level.273 For instance, the Illinois-based Society for Vascular
Surgery (SVS) PSO274 shares patient safety information between regional
267. PSO Fast Facts, supra note 174.
268. See supra Section III.B.
269. Clancy, supra note 168, at 318. Dr. Clancy further explained that state peer review
protections are limited or nonexistent (as in Florida); thus, the fluctuating degree of protection has
contributed to the fear of liability and sanctions among healthcare providers. Id.
270. Id.
271. PSO Fast Facts, supra note 174.
272. See AM. MED. ASS’N, supra note 201, at 3; see also Clancy, supra note 168, at 319 (“This
continuous confidential flow of information will serve an important educational role for individual
and multiple organizations.”).
273. Clancy, supra note 168, at 320; see also PSO Fast Facts, supra note 174.
274. Geographic Directory, supra note 14. As a specialty-based PSO, the SVS PSO enables
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groups, including Carolinas Vascular Study Group, Florida Vascular Study
Group, Mid-Atlantic Vascular Study Group, Southern California Vascular
Study Group, Southern Vascular Outcomes Network, and Vascular Study
Group of New England.275 Therefore, a PSO is essentially a “learning
organization” that applies acquired knowledge to help the organization
adapt to change276 by promoting the sharing of patient safety data outside
of a provider’s own system on a larger geographic scale.
Admittedly, joining a PSO presents some disadvantages. For instance,
once information is placed in a PSO, it can no longer be removed.277 This
inability to retrieve PSO-submitted PSWP is especially critical to a
physician who sues after the loss of privileges following a peer review
committee review; the physician will be unable to access the document in
order to defend against the committee’s allegations.278 Additionally, the
terminating committee is unable to use its findings in the peer review
document to support its decision to terminate the physician’s privileges.
The protection of PSWP submitted to a PSO will also limit a physician’s
ability to defend with PSWP in a medical malpractice lawsuit.279
Furthermore, this inability to retrieve documents submitted to a PSO has
dramatic implications in combination with Florida’s “Three Strikes”
Amendment, which mandates revocation of a physician’s license following
three or more instances of medical malpractice.280 The PSQIA is silent on
how long PSWP can remain in a PSES; thus, healthcare providers can wait
months or even years before submitting patient safety event information to
a PSO.281 The information is still protected PSWP because it is located
within a PSES.282 However, withholding information from a PSO can
delay the analysis of current information.

the sharing of data from specific vascular treatments. See SVS PSO, VASCULARWEB (Mar. 2011),
http://www.vascularweb.org/practiceresources/svs-pso/Pages/SVS-PSO.aspx [hereinafter SVS
PSO].
275. SVS PSO, supra note 274.
276. Dotan, supra note 154, at 142.
277. 42 C.F.R. § 3.20 (2010); AM. MED. ASS’N, supra note 201, at 14.
278. This disadvantage is a similar argument used by peer review critics. See supra Section
II.D.
279. See supra Section II.D.
280. See supra note 24.
281. Florida healthcare providers can be guided by the medical malpractice statute of
limitations and statute of repose in determining when a provider may need to access the submitted
materials in order to defend itself in a medical malpractice lawsuit. See FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4)(b).
However, because Amendment 7’s application has been upheld in lawsuits other than medical
malpractice, such as a lawsuit for defamation and tortious interference with a business relationship
in Amisub North Ridge Hospital, Inc. v. Sonaglia, 995 So. 2d 999, 1000–01 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2008), healthcare providers should not rely fully on the medical malpractice statute of limitations
and statute of repose.
282. See AM. MED. ASS’N, supra note 201, at 21.
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Additionally, PSOs are not federally funded283 and forming or joining a
PSO can be expensive. For instance, the Patient Safety Organization of
Florida, Inc., requires an annual subscription fee of $35.00 per licensed
bed.284 Additional costs for joining a PSO include the hiring and training of
PSO staff and the creation of facilities for storing PSWP. Because
providers within a PSO may not have the same reporting databases or
software, PSOs may also incur costs related to the common formatting of
PSESs. In order to address this problem, the members of Clarity PSO use
Healthcare SafetyZone Portal.285 While the use of the same software
addresses common formatting issues, it also increases costs for joining a
PSO because a healthcare provider must incur costs for purchasing the
software and training staff.
Despite these costs, PSOs foster a “learning organization” in which
healthcare providers can learn from their mistakes and from the mistakes
of others.286 While Amendment 7 has become an obstacle to peer review’s
effectiveness and Florida providers’ ability to analyze and learn from
patient safety events, PSOs offer an alternative route to ensure the quality
of healthcare. Through the sharing of patient safety event information
between providers within PSOs and the NSPD, Florida providers will be
able to counteract Amendment 7 and guarantee that the exchange of this
data continues. As a result, there will likely be fewer adverse medical
incidents and thus fewer medical malpractice lawsuits,287 resulting in
reduced court costs, reduced attorney’s fees, fewer settlements, and lower
medical malpractice premiums. As consumer patients, Floridians will
benefit from reduced medical costs and increased quality of healthcare.
CONCLUSION
The full effect of the PSQIA on the quality of healthcare has yet to be
determined. As the number of PSOs continues to increase and the level of
interaction between PSOs and the NPSD continues to grow, the assessment
of patient safety information will foster a learning environment among
healthcare providers. Recognizing the need for development, Dr. Clancy
stated, “The AHRQ expects that health providers and PSOs will climb a
283. See Kerr, supra note 158, at 323.
284. Memorandum from Bruce Rueben, President, Fla. Hosp. Ass’n, and Linda Quick,
President, S. Fla. Hosp. & Healthcare Ass’n, to Hospital Executive (Sept. 21, 2009), available at
www.psoflorida.com/files/PSO-ExecutiveLtr0809.doc.
285. See Healthcare SafetyZone Portal, CLARITY GRP., INC., http://www.claritygrp.com/media/
3783/portal_brochure_2011_-_4_sep._pages.pdf; Clarity PSO, CLARITY GRP., INC., http://www.cla
ritygrp.com/media/9623/claritypsobrochure2011.pdf.
286. Dotan, supra note 154, at 142–44, 146.
287. See Sullivan & Anderson, supra note 40, at 46 (“When hospital conditions and patient
care improve and the rates of death and disease decline, the number of medical malpractice lawsuits
should decline.”).
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steep learning curve as they become familiar with this new mechanism.”288
In the meantime, Amendment 7 remains in effect and continues to
broaden its scope into the once-privileged and confidential peer review
process. Because the Florida Supreme Court firmly ratified Amendment
7,289 Florida healthcare providers’ best hope is for a successful amendment
to repeal Amendment 7 in the near future.290 Otherwise, providers can
counteract Amendment 7 and ensure the quality of healthcare for Florida
patients by joining a PSO and participating in the NPSD. Thus, the
“chilling” caused by a lack of confidentiality and privilege protections for
peer review documents may be warmed up for providers who participate in
PSOs and submit peer review as PSWP. However, preventable adverse
medical errors and near-misses may not be effectively analyzed and
addressed through the peer review process in Florida unless providers incur
the costs of joining a PSO. There may be other methods to avoid the broad
reach of Amendment 7. For instance, some suggest that the closer
involvement of attorneys in the peer review process could bring peer
review records under the protection of the attorney-client privilege or
work-product doctrine.291 Additional suggestions to help the peer review
process adapt to Amendment 7 include: substituting written documents
with oral discussions; including only facts in incident reports and
eliminating all commentary; and deleting negative language in peer review
documents.292

288. Clancy, supra note 168, at 320. Due to this learning curve, AHRQ is available for
assistance to help PSOs. Id.
289. See supra Section II.C.
290. For example, Florida voters approved a constitutional amendment for a high-speed train
system throughout the state in the November 2000 election. November 7, 2000 General Election,
Official Results, Constitutional Amendment, DIV. ELECTIONS, FLA. DEP’T STATE,
http://doe.dos.state.fl.us/elections/resultsarchive/SummaryRpt.asp?ElectionDate=11/7/2000&Rac
e=AMD (last visited Jan. 29, 2012). Yet in 2004, then-Governor Jeb Bush endorsed an effort to
repeal the amendment due to its immense costs. Overview, FLA. HIGH SPEED RAIL,
http://www.floridabullettrain.com/fhsra/1_overview.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2012). Featured on
the same ballot as Amendment 7 in November 2004, the repeal of the high-speed rail amendment
was approved by the voters. 2004 Election Results, supra note 22.
291. Coombs, supra note 23, at 418. Yet, courts throughout Florida have held that adverse
incident reports are not protected under the attorney work-product protection and are subject to
discovery under Amendment 7. See Fla. Eye Clinic v. Gmach, 14 So. 3d 1044, 1049–50 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 2009); Lakeland Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Neely ex rel. Neely, 8 So. 3d 1268, 1269–71
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2009). In Gmach, the Fifth District reasoned that when the disputed adverse
incident reports were created, defense counsel had not yet been consulted or even involved in the
lawsuit. The court further explained that even if the reports were created in anticipation of litigation,
they were fact work product because they did not represent defense counsel’s opinions of the
lawsuit. Gmach, 14 So. 3d at 1050–51. Therefore, later involvement of attorneys will not immunize
the disclosure of adverse incident reports under Amendment 7; involvement would have to occur at
the earlier creation stages of the reports.
292. See Parisi & Tsitsakis, supra note 118, at 12.
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The coming years will demonstrate the effect of Amendment 7 on the
peer review process in Florida. While the relationship between
Amendment 7 and the PSQIA has yet to be fully determined, the peer
review process in Florida still remains in potential danger even under the
confidentiality and privilege protections of the PSQIA. The PSQIA only
provides protection to PSWP and does not afford protection to any reports
required under state statutes. Thus, Code 15 and annual reports pursuant to
section 395.0197 are still under Amendment 7’s scope. Because of this
lack of protection by the state, some commentators have advocated for the
creation of a uniform and consistent federal peer review privilege by
Congress. 293 However, as evidenced by the controversy surrounding the
passage of healthcare reform in 2010, any additional proposals to change
the national healthcare system will likely face steadfast opposition;
therefore, such attempts probably will not be made in the near future. In the
meantime, the quality of healthcare for Florida patients remains at stake.

293. See Clancy, supra note 168, at 318; Sullivan & Anderson, supra note 40, at 86–87.
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